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COMMENTS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-MINOR PLAINTIFF-DROWNING
CASES-No PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE*-A minor is not re-
quired to exercise as high a degree of care for his own protection as
an adult. Due care of a minor need be only that degree of care com-
mensurate with his age,' maturity, intelligence, and experience.' This
deviation from the "reasonable man" standard is justified on the
grounds that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a minor is
lacking in judgment, i.e., his normal state is that of recognized in-
capacity.3
As a child grows older his "capacity," or ability to protect him-
self, normally increases. Measuring this increase is, of course, a dif-
ficult task. A few jurisdictions have established a system of rebuttable
presumptions for this purpose. This system provides that a child
under the age of seven lacks the maturity to be capable of being guilty
of contributory negligence ;4 a child between seven and fourteen has
such requisite maturity; and minors above the age of fourteen may
be chargeable as an adult" or unable to recover under the attractive
* Mellas v. Lowdermilk, 58 N.M. 363, 271 P.2d 399 (1954) ; Martinez v. C.R. Davis
Contracting Co., 73 N.M. 474, 389 P.2d 597 (1964).
1. Although only "age" is mentioned in some cases, this is because courts presume,
in the absence of a claim of inferiority, that the child has the intelligence and experience
common to children of its age. Verdon v. Crescent Auto. Co., 80 N.J.L. 199, 76 Atd. 346
(Sup. Ct. 1910).
2. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955) ; Archuleta v. Jacobs,
43 N.M. 425, 94 P.2d 706 (1939).
3. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 At. 457 (1931), Annot., 73 A.L.R.
1266 (1931). This opinion is a scholarly discussion of both primary and contributory
negligence of a minor.
4. Wilderman, Presumptions Existing in Favor of the Infant in Re: The Question of
an Infant's Ability to be Guilty of Contributory Negligence, 10 Ind. L.J. 427 (1935) ; 65
C.J.S. Negligence § 218 (1950).
5. Sheetz v. Welch, 89 Ga. App. 749, 81 S.E.2d 319 (1954). In dicta the court stated
that a fourteen year old boy was presumptively chargeable as an adult in the operation
of a motorcycle, applying Ga. Code Ann. § 105-204 (1956):
Due care in a child of tender years is such as its capacity, mental and physical,
fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation
under investigation.
In Davis v. Jones, 60 N.M. 470, 292 P.2d 773 (1956), the jury found a fourteen year old
boy guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of a motorcycle. Without referring
to any presumption, the finding was affirmed on appeal. The court simply stated that
the boy was capable of riding and controlling a motorcycle and old enough to know
and appreciate the danger.
nuisance doctrine.6 Such a system has been critized as being arbitrary,
mechanical, and contrary to fact.7 New Mexico follows what is con-
sidered the better view and refuses to adopt any system of presump-
tions based solely on the age of the child. Rather, the New Mexico
court has recognized that the age at which mental and physical
maturity is reached is dependent upon many factors each varying with
the particular child.8 Accordingly, it has been held that even a seven-
teen year old should not have his standard of care measured by adult
standards.'
Despite the general disfavor of presumptions based solely on age,
other presumptions regarding the capacity of a minor to recognize
and avoid particular dangers are widely accepted. For example, if the
minor participates in athletics'0 or engages in an activity usually
reserved for adults, such as drinking" or driving,' 2 he is expected to
be capable of coping with the incident dangers. A minor is also pre-
sumed to be aware, at an early age, of those hazards common to
nature.'3 The most common application of this presumption has been
to the danger of drowning.'4 Before 1964, the leading New Mexico
6. Keck v. Woodring, 201 Okla. 665, 208 P.2d 1133 (1948) ; Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W. 175 (1927), Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1328 (1927).
7. For a general criticism of this system of presumption see: Shulman, The Standard
of Care Required of Children, 37 Yale L.J. 618 (1928) ; 1 Thompson, Commentaries on
the Law of Negligence §§ 307-18 (2d ed. 1901) ; also, 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 205
(1941).
8. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955). This case involved a
plaintiff thirteen years old but having the mentality of a ten year old. The plaintiff was
injured in traffic after having been let off defendant's bus in a dangerous location. The
court commented that although maturity cannot be measured with mathematical accuracy,
it is universally recognized that it is not reached at the age of thirteen.
9. McMullen v. Ursuline Order of Sisters, 56 N.M. 570, 246 P.2d 1052 (1952). A
directed verdict for the defendant, based on a finding that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, was reversed on appeal. The defendant
school had allowed the plaintiff and other students to help mine shale for a school project.
At the entrance to the "mine" was an overhang of some five feet supported by what
appeared to be solid rock. The plaintiff was injured when this overhang collapsed. After
commenting that the plaintiff was inexperienced in mining and had not seen the mine
previously, the court concluded that a jury could reasonably find him free of contribu-
tory negligence. From a reading of the fact situation one could surmise that the hazard
was, in fact, so latent that an adult might not recognize the danger.
10. Englehart v. Phillips, 136 Ohio St. 73, 23 N.E.2d 829 (1939).
11. Robinson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 135 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 1961).
12. See Robinson v. Kathryn, 23 Il1. App. 2d 5, 161 N.E.2d 477 (1959), Annot., 74
A.L.R.2d 1089 (1960) ; and cases cited in note 5 supra.
13. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 427 (1959).
14. See McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 16 La. App. 234, 133 So. 524 (1931) ; see also
cases cited in Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 427, 456 (1959). Dean
Prosser goes on to itemize similar dangers such as fire, falling from heights, or into ex-
cavations, ordinary visible machinery, sliding or caving soil, etc.
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decision expounding this presumption was Mellas v. Lowdermilk.5
The court in Mellas established, by way of dicta, a presumption that
a nine year old plaintiff had the capacity to comprehend and avoid
the dangers associated with a body of water. However, a later New
Mexico case 6 declined to follow Mellas on this point, and it can
safely be said that there exists no presumption in New Mexico
regarding the age at which a minor is held to appreciate dangers
common to bodies of water. The decision not to follow Mellas was
a proper one.
In Mellas, a nine year old plaintiff drowned while swimming in
defendant's irrigation pond. Although the defendant knew the pond
was used for swimming, he had not opened the pond for public use;
"no trespassing" signs had been posted on the fences surrounding
the premises. Furthermore, the pond was located in a relatively
isolated area. The trial court entered judgment upon a verdict for
the plaintiff. The New Mexico Supreme Court on appeal, held, Re-
versed.17 The supreme court found no basis for a finding of the de-
fendant's primary negligence. Furthermore, the court recognized
the weight of authority holding that, in the absence of an unusual
element of danger, bodies of water were patent dangers and not
attractive nuisances.1 8 This ruling, it was felt, was consistent with
public policy:
[B]odies of water ...are extremely useful in this state, not only
to defendants and to the mining industry in the necessary and proper
conduct of their business, but to livestock men, farmers and fruit grow-
ers . .. and are indispensible for the maintenance of life and prop-
er'ty. 19
The supreme court in Mellas went on to say that the plaintiff could
not have recovered in any event. Even had the defendant been neg-
ligent there was "nothing in the record to contravene the legal pre-
15. 58 N.M. 363, 271 P.2d 399 (1954).
16. Martinez v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 73 N.M. 474, 389 P.2d 597 (1964).
17. Mellas v. Lowdermilk, 58 N.M. 363, 369, 271 P.2d 399, 402 (1954).
18. The Mellas decision was followed on the question of attractive nuisance in Foster
v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.M. 1959), aff'd 'without opinion, 280 F.2d 431
(10th Cir. 1960). Recovery was sought for the drowning of children aged four and
seven in a canal maintained by the United States Government. The court assumed that
the canal was not a "dangerous instrumentality," but, conceding it had been, in any event
the danger should have been apparent to the mother.
19. Mellas v. Lowdermilk, 58 N.M. 363, 369, 271 P.2d 399,403 (1954).
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sumption that . . . a boy nine years old, had the capacity to
comprehend and avoid the danger .... ,,20 and failure to do so made
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Ten years later, Martinez v. C. R. Davis Contracting Co. 21 was
decided. In Martinez, a fourteen year old plaintiff drowned in a pool
formed by rain filling an excavation. Unlike Mellas, the defendant's
negligence was well established. The pool was not in an isolated area
but rather was located in a city street, the excavation having been
made for the purpose of constructing a sewer line. The defendant-
contractor had failed to put up barricades, there were insufficient
watchmen in the area, and the defendant had actual knowledge that
children played in and around the excavation.
On the issue of contributory negligence, it appeared that the
plaintiff lived near the excavation and that he had been warned by
his parents to stay away from the area because of the danger. The
evidence introduced concerning the plaintiff's capacity was that he
was of average intelligence for his age and made average grades in
school. The plaintiff was also a beginning swimmer. The jury was
given the standard instruction as to the degree of care required of a
minor and returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Relying on the decision
in Mellas v. Lowdermilk, the defendant appealed, contending that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
The supreme court on appeal, held, Affirmed.22 The supreme court
stated that if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the child
realized the risk in coming within the dangerous area the decision
should be affirmed; there being no reason for a different rule where
ponds or lakes are involved than where other dangerous instrumen-
talities cause the injury. Further, the supreme court said, insofar as
Mellas states a rule of due care of a minor differently, it is not con-
trolling.
It may be noted that the Mellas case was tried on the attractive
nuisance theory and the Martinez opinion did not mention this doc-
trine, but applied general negligence law. The New Mexico Supreme
Court did not draw and has not drawn any meaningful distinctions
between the two areas of law, 3 and for the purpose of discussing the
20. Id. at 366, 271 P.2d at 401. (Emphasis the court's.)
21. 73 N.M. 474, 389 P.2d 597 (1964).
22. Id. at 477, 389 P.2d at 599. Two justices dissented. One found no breach of a
legal duty owing to plaintiff, and the second dissented on the grounds that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
23. See Klaus v. Eden, 70 N.M. 371, 375, 374 P.2d 129, 131 (1962): "As a matter of
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contributory negligence of older children there appear to be none. 24
In either legal theory the capacity of the minor to appreciate the
particular risk and whether he used due care to avoid his injury are
generally considered to be questions of fact.25 The attitude of the
courts appears to be that the jury's knowledge of human nature
generally, and of children in particular, makes the jury so qualified to
resolve these issues that even expert testimony as to children's be-
havior would be a mere waste of time. 26
The courts also recognize, however, the tendency of a jury to be
overly sympathetic with child-plaintiffs. This temptation is especially
strong if the jury realizes that an obviously negligent defendant will
be completely exonerated if contributory negligence is found.2 7 Fac-
tors improperly and perhaps unreasonably influencing the mind of
the jury supposedly will have less effect upon the mind of the judge.
His training has "impressed upon his mind the necessity of fixed laws,
and has taught him how destructive of these is the yielding to sym-
pathy." 12
Confronted with these divergent views, the courts' problem is to
develop a system of criteria to be used to determine whether a
particular situation is properly decided as a matter of law, as in the
Mellas case, or by the jury, as in Martinez. Traditionally, if a minor
in possession of all his faculties fails to avoid a simple or obvious
hazard, the court will find him contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. A minor, it is contended, by the time he reaches his teens and
fact, we see nothing different in the so-called law of attractive nuisance and the general
law of negligence, except that involved is a recognition of the habits and characteristics
of very young children." Cf. McFall v. Shelley, 70 N.M. 390, 374 P.2d 141 (1962).
24. See Hoff v. Natural Ref. Prods. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 222, 118 A.2d 714, 722 (Super.
Ct. 1955) :
There has been a pronounced tendency on the part of many courts to equate
the factor of appreciation of the risk or danger by the child plaintiff in this
kind of case [attractive nuisance] with the defense of contributory negligence.
...While it is comprehensible that, conceptually, there are separate and dis-
tinct considerations, the first going to the existence of the duty from the defend-
ant to the particular plaintiff and the other to a defense, assuming the existence
of a primary duty ... it is obvious that the capacity of a particular child to
perceive and appreciate the risk in a specific situation is an integral component
of the concept of contributory negligence.
25. 1 Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence §§ 316-18 (2d ed. 1901)
see also the cases collected in Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 932 (1961).
26. Keet, Contributory Negligence of Children, 12 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 395 (1963).
27. James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953). Although James was
writing about adult plaintiffs, would not the same be true, a fortiori, when the plaintiff
is a child?
28. 3 Cooley, Torts § 481 (4th ed. 1932).
probably before, knows as well as an adult that fire will burn, a wasp
will sting, water will drown, a locomotive will kill, or cold will freeze,
and he may be held to know these things as a matter of law.29
This contention has been used not only to determine whether the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, but also in deciding if the de-
fendant should be liable for the injury. Because a great many of the
child-plaintiff cases are tried on the attractive nuisance theory, a great
many defendants are owners or occupiers of land. There should be
certain categories of dangers that are so obvious that the landowner
may safely assume that any child who is of sufficient age to be with-
out parental supervision will appreciate these dangers and avoid
them. Bodies of water are one such category of danger, being not
only obvious hazards, but also so common, natural, and necessary
that they are not the kind of "dangerous instrumentalities" that are
attractive nuisances. ° Only three jurisdictions have held otherwise
and then only when the water serves no useful purpose 31 or is located
where numbers of young children are known to play.3 2
The general pattern under the traditional analysis, then, is that it
is difficult for an older child-plaintiff to recover for drowning. Addi-
tional factors may be present in a given situation to create exceptions.
If the body of water is made abnormally dangerous by some unusual
characteristic, the risk of injury is so increased that liability may
follow. Certainly the fact that the body of water is abnormally
dangerous presupposes that it is no longer a common and obvious
hazard; and, therefore, the main reason for denying recovery either
disappears or diminishes.
If it can be shown that the body of water was unusually dangerous
and that the defendant was primarily liable for the resulting injury,
it remains to be decided whether the question of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence should be decided by the court or by the jury.
The propriety of submitting the case to the jury is usually determined
by interrelating the factors of (a) the degree of maturity of the child
and (b) the latency, or per contra, the obviousness of the hazard. If
29. See McGee v. Wabash R.R., 214 Mo. 530, 114 S.W. 33 (1908).
30. Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1948); Lockridge v. Standard Oil Co., 124 Ind. App.
257, 114 N.E.2d 807 (1953) ; Bass v. Quinn-Robbins Co., 70 Idaho 308, 216 P.2d 944
(1950) ; Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N.W. 760 (1914).
31. Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex.' 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948) ; Renno v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 120 S.C. 7,112 S.E. 439 (1922).
32. Peters v. City of Tampa, 115 Fla. 666, 155 So. 854 (1934).
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a question is raised by such an analysis upon which fair-minded men
could reasonably differ, the case is submitted to the jury.33
A few examples illustrate this interrelation of factors. In cases
where the water itself is not visible because of a collection of scum or
refuse on the surface, the question is best left to the jury.34 Likewise,
the jury should decide the question if the hazard is a swift undercur-
rent in a swimming area.3" In such instances, the maturity of the
plaintiff is incidental in comparison to the latency of the hazard; it
being unlikely that even an adult could be expected to recognize the
danger. The plaintiff may be injured by wading into a sudden drop
off, 36 by relying upon a "false bank" which thaws and collapses, 37 or
by diving against a pipe beneath the surface of a swimming pool.38
Although more obvious, these hazards are still not so patent as to
preclude a teenage plaintiff from having a jury determination of his
contributory negligence. Conversely, the addition of a danger no
more latent than slippery sides on an otherwise ordinary dirt reser-
voir is not sufficient to prevent the dismissal of the complaint of a
fourteen year old plaintiff.39 J fortiori, if no unusual danger is in-
volved, the obviousness of the danger of drowning prevents recovery
by children fourteen and over as a matter of law.40
The fact that the Martinez case escapes this traditional approach
is best pointed out by comparing the attitude of the New Mexico
court in that case to the attitude of the Texas Supreme Court in
33. Hoff v. Natural Ref. Prods. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 222, 118 A.2d 714 (Super. Ct.
1955). In this opinion Justice Conford compiled a cross sampling of cases involving
different kinds of attractive nuisances and plaintiffs from thirteen to fifteen years old.
34. Cicero State Bank v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 298 IlI. App. 290, 18 N.E.2d 574
(1939) ; cf. Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).
35. Perkins v. Byrnes, 364 Mo. 849, 269 S.W.2d 52 (1954).
36. City of Altus v. Millikin, 98 Okla. 1, 223 Pac. 851 (1924). However, the plaintiff
will not get to the jury even if he is younger (under eleven) and has been somehow
warned of the drop off. See Phipps v. Mitze, 116 Colo. 288, 180 P.2d 233 (1947).
37. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Smith, 90 Colo. 464,21 P.2d 1116 (1933).
38. Liguori v. City of Philadelphia, 351 Pa. 494, 41 A.2d 563 (1945).
39. Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d 449 (1950).
40. The particular age at which a minor plaintiff is charged with awareness of the
danger varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See City of Evansville v. Blue, 212 Ind.
130, 8 N.E.2d 224 (1937) (eleven) ; Turner v. City of Moberly, 224 Mo. 683, 26 S.W.2d
997 (1930) (fourteen) ; McFarland v. Grau, 305 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App. 1957) (fifteen) ;
Adams v. Brookwood Country Club, 16 Ill. App. 2d 263, 148 N.E.2d 39 (1958). Adams
refused to follow Cicero State Bank v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 298 11. App. 290, 18
N.E.2d 574 (1939) (see note 34 supra), which had allowed a fourteen year old to re-
cover for drowning after falling through what appeared to be solid ground and denied
recovery to a nine year old who drowned in a stream "as dangerous as any other
stream but not more so." But see contra, Smith v. Evans, 178 Kan. 259, 284 P.2d 1065
(1955) (thirteen year old plaintiff).
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Massie v. Copeland.41 Both cases involved a fourteen year old plain-
tiff who drowned in an utterly useless body of water located in a
populous area. In both cases, the defendant's primary negligence
having been established, 2 the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
was a decisive factor. Although the fact patterns of both cases were
substantially identical, the results were not. Martinez was allowed to
recover, but in Massie the Texas Supreme Court took judicial notice
that
a normal fourteen year old boy is of high school age. He is well ad-
vanced in Boy Scout activities if a member of that organization. If
not a member of it, he nevertheless has spent enough time outdoors
to understand its attractions and its dangers. 43
The Texas court held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.
Martinez is the prime example of the postulate that the New
Mexico Supreme Court is very liberal in allowing the child-plaintiff
the individualized determination of his negligence afforded by a jury
verdict.44 The objective of such a policy seems to have merit. When a
court substitutes its judgment for that of the jury of what is to be
expected of a particular child there always exists the possibility that a
court might be mistaken. If a court is, in fact, mistaken, then a
negligent defendant is exonerated. Assuming one of the goals of
jurisprudence to be the prevention of the recurrence of misfortunes
like drownings, it seems better to give the plaintiff the benefit of the
doubt afforded by a jury determination, even though the jury might
be sympathetic to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is motivated by his own
instincts of self preservation to prevent such recurrences; the defend-
ant should have the incentive created by an imposition of liability.
When the Mellas opinion created the presumption that children
nine or older are contributorily negligent if they should drown in an
41. 149 Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d 449 (1950).
42. Texas has applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to similar water hazards. See
Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948) ; note 31 supra.
43. Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319, 322, 233 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1950).
44. In connection with this liberal policy see also Zamora v. J. Korber & Co., 59 N.M.
33, 278 P.2d 569 (1955). The defendant in the Zamora case sold a rifle to the twelve year
old plaintiff in violation of a city ordinance. The plaintiff was injured when he fired the
rifle at a rock and the rebounding bullet struck his eye. The plaintiff testified that he had
fired guns on several occasions and knew that they were extremely dangerous. On this
evidence the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The supreme court reversed, holding that,
in spite of the plaintiff's own statements, the question should be resolved by the jury.
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open body of water, it did so needlessly. The presumption was merely
a buttressing argument to the finding that the defendant was not
negligent. This same presumption has been used in this same manner
in other jurisdictions, the end result being likewise unnecessary state-
ments that children of seven "instinctively" know the dangers of
drowning-a very tenuous position at best.4 5 Perhaps other courts
feel that without such a presumption it will be difficult to find satis-
factory criteria by which to limit defendants' liability. In any event,
the Mellas presumption has been interred in New Mexico. Since
Mellas occupied an incongrous place in New Mexico's generally
liberal scheme of determining the contributory negligence of a child-
plaintiff, few should mourn its passing.
THOMAS L. BONHAM
45. See, e.g., Betts v. City & County of San Francisco, 108 Cal. App. 2d 701, 239 P.2d
456 (1952) ; Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac. 414 (1918).
[VOL. 5
